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 The Technology of Political 
Communication:  
R. v. Bryan and the Knowledgeable 
Voter in the 21st Century 
Richard Haigh 
… the world of the third millennium is inevitably, is ineradicably 
modern, and … it is our intellectual duty to submit to that modernity, 
and to dismiss as sentimental and inherently fraudulent all yearnings 
for what is dubiously termed the “original”. 
Julian Barnes — London, London 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid development and prevalence of new information and 
communication technologies have radically reshaped the “interplay” 
between democracy and communication. It is no longer advisable to 
separate the study of democracy from a study of technological expansion. 
The growth and merger of the information and communication industries 
has changed the very meaning of democracy. Successive Canadian 
governments have articulated a vision of being known around the world 
as the government most connected to its citizens.1  
Arguably, the Internet enables citizens to become more informed 
and more engaged participants in the development and maintenance of a 
social and political identity. However, it may well be a victim of its own 
success. As with the question whether a tree falling in a forest makes a 
sound without a listener there to hear it, it is now not too far-fetched to 
ask whether information that is not retrievable via a keyword-search and 
                                                                                                             

  Visiting Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. Many thanks to Orna Fogel, Queen’s LLB 
(expected 2008) for her excellent research assistance; Michael Sobkin, Jacqueline Krikorian, 
Warren Newman and Charlotte Davis for suggestions and comments on an earlier draft. 
1
  Canada, Speech from the Throne to open the second session, 36th Parliament of Canada, 
October 12 (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1999). 
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logarithmic equation from the index of a popular search-engine, actually 
exists. There is a growing movement, perhaps generational,2 that 
believes all knowledge will soon be available on the Internet, that 
information is less valuable if it is not on the Internet, and that access to 
the Internet is a prerequisite to being a fully informed citizen.  
Like older technologies such as radio and television, the Internet 
serves to facilitate and mediate technology. Unlike older forms of 
communication, however, the nature of computers and networks means 
that they can serve as both an information retrieval system and 
communication device. They allow for the simultaneous reception and 
production of information. Computers have the power to make 
individuals publishers, broadcasters, commentators, analysts, readers, 
viewers and listeners. At the same time, as with any powerful institution, 
the Internet is not value- or ideology-free. It delivers information with 
ready-made cultural assumptions, biases and slants. In other words, it 
can determine culture simply by the way the information is encoded and 
transmitted.  
Moreover, the Internet can be socially isolating. Those who regularly 
access the Internet3 risk removing themselves from a physical agora into 
an e-gora. Instead of face-to-face transactions, they can become 
increasingly dependent on the Internet for community. Evidence exists 
that this is happening. Chat rooms, blogs, website memberships, online 
dating sites, Facebook and other social networking sites are now 
mediating many elements of social interaction. More and more political 
and social discussion occurs via online communities. All this raises 
potential questions: does debate and discussion occur differently in an 
online community? Is there less opportunity for dissenting views 
amongst homogeneous online communities? Or a stratification of 
viewpoints? In other words, does the Internet frustrate rather than 
promote informed political debate?  
Coupled with this socio-cultural reformation is the Internet’s 
technical complexity. The vast majority of the people who use it have no 
idea how it works. Control over carriage is largely left to technicians and 
                                                                                                             
2
  There is a lot of popular literature on “Generation Y” (those born between 1975 and 
1990) and how they think and work differently. For example, see Virginia Galt, “The Generational 
Divide” The Globe and Mail, March 31, 2004, at C1.  
3
  Of course, there are still a large number of Canadians who do not enjoy regular access to 
computers. But the numbers are obviously growing: recent statistics show 20.45 million users, which is 
equivalent to 63.5 per cent of the total population. 53.6 per cent of Canadians connect to the Internet 
using a type of high-speed connection, compared to 33.8 per cent in the U.S. — see Statistics Canada, 
Household Internet Use Survey, <http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/040708/d040708a.htm>. 
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industry experts, as opposed to government officials. In part, this has 
allowed it to flourish and grow to an unimaginable size in little more 
than a decade. But it also, so far, has made maintaining government 
control over content very difficult. 
These issues provide a backdrop to the recent ruling of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in R. v. Bryan.4 This paper examines the case and 
explores it in the context of new technology, focusing on the following 
two matters: whether the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the 
constitutionality of the law prohibiting the premature transmission of 
election results ignores the practical realities of new media (and possible 
unknown media inventions in the future) and its own trend-setting 
decisions in Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General)5 
and Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. 
Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers;6 and given this modern 
information age, the nature of section 1 analysis, and possible reforms of 
the Oakes test, to address the influence of technology on legal rights. 
These will be discussed after a brief review of the case. 
II. THE POLLS ARE CLOSED IN HALIFAX — 
DO YOU KNOW WHERE YOUR VOTER IS? 
In 2000 Paul Bryan, a software designer from British Columbia, 
launched a website which he eponymously titled “Bryan’s Election 
Results Canada”.7 The website was used as a vehicle to discuss then-
current Canadian politics and the upcoming November federal election. 
On the site, Bryan advertised that he intended to post the Atlantic 
Canada election results on his webpage immediately after the polls there 
closed, in direct contravention of section 329 of the Canada Elections 
Act.8  
By that time the Act had been modified to follow, at least in part, the 
recommendations of the 1991 report of the Royal Commission on 
                                                                                                             
4
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bryan”]. 
5
  [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thomson Newspapers”].  
6
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 44, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “SOCAN”]. 
7
  See <http://www.electionresultscanada.com>. See also Canadian Press, “Supreme Court 
to Rule on Election Result Blackout” Toronto Star, March 14, 2007, online: Toronto Star 
<http://www.thestar.com/News/article/191832>. 
8 
 See Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 329 [hereinafter “Act”]: “No person shall 
transmit the result or purported result of the vote in an electoral district to the public in another 
electoral district before the close of all of the polling stations in that other electoral district.” 
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Electoral Reform and Party Financing (“Lortie Commission”).9 The 
report, a two-volume compendium, provides a comprehensive assessment 
of Canada’s electoral process. It makes a number of recommendations 
related to federal elections, on topics such as the right to be a candidate, 
the role and the financing of political parties, election expense controls, 
public funding, disclosure, enforcement and broadcasting. One of the 
specific recommendations that was adopted provides for staggered 
opening and closing hours of various polling stations across Canada in 
order to minimize the effects that our multiple time zones have on the 
availability of election results. Because a significant number of ridings 
are concentrated in central time zones, the Act was amended to change 
the opening times of polls in Ontario and Quebec so that they are open 
from 9:30 a.m. to 9:30 p.m., while the westernmost ridings (B.C. and 
some of Alberta) now open at 7 a.m. and close at 7 p.m. (Atlantic 
Canada polls remaining the same at 8 a.m. to 8 p.m.). The delay in 
closure of the polls in the central time zones ensures that it will be 
impossible for the ultimate result of a federal election to be determined 
before the polls close in British Columbia.10 The new hours do not, 
however, prevent the results of Atlantic Canada from being available 
before the polls close in the West. Section 329 (first enacted under a 
different statutory provision in 1938) was not amended, thus maintaining 
the ban on the transmission of election results from areas where the polls 
had closed to time zones where the polls had not yet closed. The Act 
establishes that anyone breaching section 329 is liable to a summary 
conviction offence punishable by a fine not exceeding $25,000. 
Ignoring the warning of then-Chief Electoral Officer Jean-Pierre 
Kingsley (who had got wind of Bryan’s intention), on election night 
Bryan posted the results of Atlantic Canada before the polls in British 
Columbia and parts of Alberta had closed. He was charged under the 
Act. Although he conceded that he had breached section 329 by posting 
these early results, he challenged the law as breaching his section 2(b) 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms right to freedom of 
expression.11 The case made its way through the British Columbia courts, 
                                                                                                             
9
  Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral 
Democracy: Proposed Legislation (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1991) 
[hereinafter “Lortie Report”]. 
10
  Bryan, supra, note 4, at paras. 47, 87. 
11
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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variably winning and losing, before reaching the Supreme Court.12 Since 
the ban effectively only covers the results from Atlantic Canada,13 the 
specific issue for the Supreme Court was whether the publication of such 
results before the polls in Western Canada close can be restricted or 
whether that is an unjustifiable breach of freedom of expression under 
section 2(b). 
The Supreme Court decision consists of three separate concurring 
judgments upholding the law (on behalf of a majority of five judges) and 
a single dissenting judgment of four judges. All nine judges agreed that 
section 2(b) of the Charter was breached. The differences play out in the 
section 1 analysis. Justice Bastarache (Deschamps, Charron and Rothstein 
JJ., concurring in a separate judgment), suggests that potential voters 
who know in advance the results of Atlantic Canada could sway voting 
patterns or be discouraged from voting.14 One of his key concerns is that 
the publication of these results would make the system appear unfair to 
voters because westerners would have the advantage of knowing the 
result of some votes from another part of the country, while eastern 
voters could never enjoy the same advantage. Even if this informational 
inequality had no actual effect on voting patterns, it could shake the 
confidence Canadians have in the electoral system generally; for him, 
legitimacy depends as much on perception as reality.15  
Both Bastarache J. and Fish J. (in a separate opinion also concurred 
separately by Deschamps, Charron and Rothstein JJ.) discuss the 
difficulty and complexity of the section 1 analysis and the need to 
contextualize requirements of proof in cases such as this. Justice 
Bastarache proceeds through a detailed analysis of the four contextual 
factors (from Harper v. Canada (Attorney General)16 and Thomson 
Newspapers) that situate the legislation’s infringement of section 2(b) 
rights: (i) the nature of the harm and the inability to measure it; (ii) the 
vulnerability of the group protected; (iii) the subjective fears and 
apprehension of harm that result; and (iv) the nature of the infringed 
                                                                                                             
12
  R. v. Bryan, [2003] B.C.J. No. 318, 2003 BCPC 39 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) (application to 
declare s. 329 of the Canada Elections Act unconstitutional dismissed); R. v. Bryan, [2003] B.C.J. 
No. 2479, 2003 BCSC 1499 (B.C.S.C.) (acquittal from criminal conviction because of 
unconstitutional breach of s. 2(b) of the Charter by s. 329 of Canada Elections Act); R. v. Bryan, 
[2005] B.C.J. No. 1130, 2005 BCCA 285 (B.C.C.A.) (appeal allowed).  
13
  Bryan, supra, note 4, at para. 95. 
14
  Id., at para. 14; see also para. 19, where Bastarache J. says that logic and common sense 
must be relied upon since predicting voter actions is almost impossible.  
15
  Id., at paras. 17, 30 (per Bastarache J.); paras. 62, 78 (per Fish J.). 
16
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harper”]. 
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activity (political expression).17 For Bastarache J., the uncertainty of 
social science evidence allows the Court to rely, as it did in Harper, on 
logic and reason assisted by social science evidence to prove harm.18 He 
concludes his review of the contextual factors by observing: 
… I note that vulnerability does not play a major part in the analysis, 
but in light of the fact that prevention of Canadians’ subjective fears 
and apprehension of harm is a goal of s. 329, evidence of those 
subjective fears must be taken as important. While political expression 
is undoubtedly important, the right at issue is the putative right to 
receive election results before the polls close; restricting access to such 
information before polls close carries less weight than after they close. 
Furthermore, it has not been established that a right to such information, 
which is at the periphery of the s. 2(b) guarantee, has been breached.19 
He then proceeds effortlessly through the section 1 justificatory 
factors from Oakes. A low evidentiary standard is adopted: the first step, 
although not an “evidentiary contest”, requires only that an objective be 
“asserted” by government in order for it to be accepted by the Court as 
pressing and substantial;20 the next step, rational connection, becomes 
“eminently clear” based on reason or logic; minimal impairment is 
assessed partly through logic and reason (which constitute “appropriate 
supplements to what evidence there is”);21 and finally, since the ban is 
the only effective response available to Parliament and 70 per cent of 
Canadians believe in the importance of informational equality, logic and 
reason suggest that section 329 contributes in a salutary way to public 
confidence in the electoral system.22 In other words, none of the steps 
requires evidence more rigorous than logic or reason. 
Probably as a result of the dissent’s focus on proportionality, Fish J. 
added further reasons to the section 1 justifications provided by 
Bastarache J., specifically on the balance between deleterious and 
salutary effects of the legislative provisions. For him, the efficacy of the 
prohibition — i.e., does it affect the election outcome? — was of little 
relevance: the short delay was either effective in addressing information 
imbalance if premature release of information would affect the result, or 
                                                                                                             
17
  Bryan, supra, note 4, at para. 10. 
18
  Id., at para. 16. 
19
  Id., at para. 30. 
20
  Id., at paras. 32, 34. 
21
  Id., at para. 43. 
22
  Id., at para. 49. 
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it was effective in addressing the perception of unfairness if there was no 
effect.23 Harm arose regardless; there were simply two different types of 
harm. That also helped Fish J. lower the evidentiary standard (in the 
absence of definitive scientific evidence of harm) to rely on “logic, 
reason and some social science evidence”.24 In the end, for him, the 
salutary effects of the legislation outweighed any deleterious effects. 
Although he recognized that salutary effects may be diminished 
somewhat by technology (citing the possibility of circumventing the 
prohibition through telephone and e-mail communications), these were 
dismissed as minimal, being primarily local and not having widespread 
effect. At the same time, the deleterious effects of the delay, due solely 
to the short duration of the publication ban, were slight. 
Justice Fish concluded his reasons by turning the media intervenors’ 
arguments against themselves. (A number of major media conglomerates 
intervened, including CBC, CTV, Rogers Broadcasting, CHUM, Sun 
Media, Globe and Mail, and CanWest Media.) Although their position 
was similar to that relied upon in Thomson Newspapers — that voters 
had a right to as much information as possible regarding the election of 
their future government in order to make informed and strategic voting 
choices — they also assumed that the premature publication of Atlantic 
election results would have an effect on other voters’ choices.25 Their 
point was that voters have the right to allow such information to affect 
their choices. Justice Fish held that this illustrates perfectly that western 
Canadians could be influenced how and even whether to vote.26 
Justice Abella wrote the dissent on behalf of McLachlin C.J.C., 
Binnie and LeBel JJ. The key issue for the minority was the sufficiency 
of the government’s evidence justifying the breach of section 2(b). In the 
final analysis, Abella J. found that the government had not provided 
reasoned demonstration that the benefits of the limitation outweighed its 
harmful effects. Her assessment was harsh: “[a]ny evidence of harm to 
                                                                                                             
23
  Id., at para. 66. 
24
  Id., at para. 69. 
25
  See Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 5. Bryan is not an example of the Court 
overruling itself or being inconsistent with the doctrine of stare decisis — technically the ban on 
polling (which was at issue in Thomson Newspapers) is still in effect on the day of voting. Bryan 
makes much less sense if the Court’s concern is with strategic voting. The main problem, however, 
was not over people voting strategically — it was with voters not having equal access to information 
that allows them to vote strategically (information equality). Unlike Western Canadian voters, 
voters in the Atlantic provinces do not have the benefit of results from elsewhere in order to vote 
strategically. 
26
  Bryan, supra, note 4, at para. 77. 
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the public’s perception or conduct in knowing the election results from 
Atlantic Canada before they vote is speculative, inconclusive and largely 
unsubstantiated.”27 She also argued that the majority overvalued the 
evidence. For her, prior publication of election results has only been 
shown to affect voter behaviour where it deals with the likely outcome 
of the entire election, i.e., not just results from a small number of ridings 
which will be inconclusive to the result as a whole. Given Canada’s 
unequally distributed population, results from Atlantic Canada are 
unlikely to have any predictive value. In other words, for the minority 
there was nothing in the evidence to suggest an inherently harmful effect 
attributable to the mere presence of an information imbalance.28 They 
accepted that scientific proof of this premise is unavailable; however, 
there must still be a “reasoned or logical basis” for assessing the validity 
of a claim that the harm created by protecting expression outweighs the 
benefits of information equality. In fact, the minority concluded that 
there was no demonstrated benefit to the limitation at all.29  
In sum, Bryan continues the long history of a Supreme Court divided 
over expressive rights, particularly in the nature and operation of section 
1 in the face of breaches of those rights.30 The next section looks in more 
detail at that divide in the context of modern technology. 
III. BRYAN IN CONTEXT 
1.  On Modernization, Technology and Community 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that legitimacy and popular 
opinion are connected. In R. v. Burlingham,31 L’Heureux-Dubé J., albeit 
                                                                                                             
27
  Id., at para. 107 (emphasis added). 
28
  Id., at paras. 117, 120. 
29
  Id., at para. 132. 
30
  It is also another case dealing with the constitutionality of some aspect of elections, or 
democratic process problems as they are known. Colin Feasby has written a number of articles on 
this issue: see, for example, “Freedom of Expression and the Law of the Democratic Process” 
(2005) S.C.L.R. (2d) 237; “The Supreme Court of Canada’s Political Theory and the 
Constitutionality of the Political Finance Regime” in K.D. Ewing & Samuel Issacharoff, eds., Party 
Funding and Campaign Financing in International Perspective (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006); 
and “Constitutional Questions About Canada’s New Political Finance Regime” (2007) 45(3) 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 513. Feasby has made the point on a number of occasions that Parliament is often 
in a conflict of interest position when it comes to crafting laws dealing with the democratic process; 
and a court assessing contextual factors related to deference should be mindful of this. However, in 
the above-noted 2007 article he observes that Bryan is different in that there is no inherent conflict 
of interest in MPs wishing to restrict the access of westerners to eastern election results (at 543).  
31
  [1995] S.C.J. No. 39, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.). 
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in the context of section 24(2) of the Charter with its requirement for 
maintaining the repute of the administration of justice, noted the 
importance of the link between legitimacy and public opinion:  
… in the application and enforcement of our laws, our constitutional 
values [should] neither run too far ahead nor lag too far behind our 
basic values as a society. One of [s. 24’s] purposes is therefore to 
ensure that the institution charged with upholding those fundamental 
values does not lose legitimacy in the eyes of those whose values it is 
entrusted to protect.32 
In Vriend v. Alberta33 Iacobucci J. took this concept a little further, by 
recognizing that the courts are not isolated from society at large: “hardly 
a day goes by without some comment or criticism to the effect that under 
the Charter courts are wrongfully usurping the role of the legislatures.”34 
Later on, Bastarache J., speaking extra-judicially, remarked that it is 
essential that the Supreme Court not be out of step with the general 
public, identifying links between public scrutiny, public opinion and 
legitimacy.35 Of course, as the Supreme Court has often noted (particularly 
in the criminal law context), it is sometimes necessary for the protection 
of fundamental values for a court to go against the tides of public 
opinion.36 The balance is therefore a delicate one; but at a minimum we 
have moved beyond hearing complaints that high court pronouncements 
are obscure and of marginal relevance to the general public.37 
Another marker of legitimacy is currency. There are signs here too 
that the Court is striving to embrace modernism; in some aspects it is 
almost presenting itself as fashionable. For example, on its current 
website,38 there are links to such pages as “Client Satisfaction Surveys”, a 
                                                                                                             
32
  Id., at para. 72. 
33
  [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (S.C.C.). 
34
  Id., at para. 130. 
35
  C. Schmitz, quoting Bastarache J., “Justice: Top Court Goes ‘Too Far’” Ottawa Citizen, 
January 13, 2001, at A7. 
36
  See, for example, R. v. Hall, [2002] S.C.J. No. 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, at paras. 50, 128 
(S.C.C.). 
37
  See, for example, Gareth Evans, “The Most Dangerous Branch? The High Court and the 
Constitution in a Changing Society” in A.D. Hambly & J.D. Goldring, eds., Australian Lawyers and 
Social Change (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1976) 13, at 74. 
38
  See <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/Welcome/index_e.asp>. Websites are no longer optional 
for virtually all businesses, government institutions and agencies. A brief, random, Internet search 
shows websites exist for the following national courts: Fiji, China, India, Venezuela and Pakistan 
(Lahore). On the other hand, decisions of Qatar courts are not published, so there is at least one court 
without a website — see <http://www.qatarlaw.com/English/sys4.htm>. 
100 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
“Court Modernization Project” and “Proactive Disclosure”.39 Chief Justice 
McLachlin appears strikingly in a white suit on the home page — and you 
can even click on the photograph to view “image details”. Some businesses 
and institutions could learn from the Court’s functional and logical 
website design (including Bryan’s own “ElectionResultsCanada.com”).  
However, most corporate and institutional websites are never far 
from being marketing and propaganda vehicles. To assess fully whether 
an institution such as the Supreme Court is keeping up with the times, 
one must scratch beneath the surface. A website is mainly gloss. The real 
test of a court’s understanding of, and attitude towards, technology must 
be determined from its decisions.  
What, then, of the Bryan decision? The majority shied away from 
dealing with technology and its effect on communication and expression. 
Were they frightened of, or ill-informed about, the world of modern 
technology? Is the Court inadvertently showing its age? If so, will this 
detract from its legitimacy as a public institution?  
Let us first go back three years before Bryan. In SOCAN, the Court 
was forced to deal with technology head-on. At issue was who should 
compensate composers and artists for Canadian copyright in music 
downloaded in Canada from Internet websites located elsewhere. Justice 
Binnie, representing an eight-member majority of the Court (including 
Bastarache and Fish JJ.) held that Parliament did not intend the 
Copyright Act40 to make Internet intermediaries (such as Internet service 
providers) “users” so as to be subject to royalties for copyright infringement. 
The majority engaged in a deep analysis of problems caused by the 
wired world, acknowledging that times have changed “when it is as easy 
to access a website hosted by a server in Bangalore as it is in Mississauga”.41 
In a lengthy discussion on the finer points of Internet protocols and 
delivery mechanisms, the majority exhibited a detailed, technical knowledge 
of the engineering behind the Internet.42 After concluding on that point, 
Binnie J. went on, noting some of the Internet’s social and cultural effects: 
… The capacity of the Internet to disseminate “works of the arts and 
intellect” is one of the great innovations of the information age …  
                                                                                                             
39
  It is comforting to know that McLachlin C.J.C. has only relied on the (at best) inelegant 
word “proactive” on two occasions: RJR-Macdonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. 
No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 158 (S.C.C.) and Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] S.C.J. No. 14, 
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, at para. 58 (S.C.C.). 
40
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42. 
41
  SOCAN, [2004] S.C.J. No. 44, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, at para. 1 (S.C.C.). 
42
  See id., at paras. 17-26. 
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[The much larger conundrum is] trying to apply national laws to  
a fast-evolving technology that in essence respects no national 
boundaries. … The issue of global forum shopping for actions for 
Internet torts has scarcely been addressed. The availability of child 
pornography on the Internet is a matter of serious concern. E-commerce 
is growing. Internet liability is thus a vast field where the legal harvest 
is only beginning to ripen.43  
And then: 
… The velocity of new technical developments in the computer industry, 
and the rapidly declining cost to the consumer, is legendary. Professor 
Takach has unearthed the startling statistic that if the automobile industry 
was able to achieve the same performance-price improvements as has the 
computer chip industry, a car today would cost under five dollars and 
would get 250,000 miles to the gallon of gasoline …44 
Here, therefore, is a situation where the Court evinces a very adept 
appreciation of technology in general and the Internet in particular.  
Obviously the basis of the litigation in SOCAN made it impossible to 
duck the issue of technology. But even if on one level Bryan is a 
straightforward matter of a person disobeying a clear law, making waves 
for his own self-aggrandizement (which Bryan surely was), the Court’s 
awkwardness in handling the technology issue belies its earlier deftness 
in SOCAN. It now seems slightly out of touch with reality; the Supreme 
Court “just doesn’t get it”. 
To begin, there is evidence in the text itself. Justice Fish states: 
I recognize, of course, that modern communications technology 
diminishes the delay’s effectiveness and thereby its salutary effects. 
Section 329 cannot and does not entirely prevent voters in Central or 
Western Canada who are determined to learn before casting their 
ballots what has transpired in the Atlantic provinces from obtaining 
that information by telephone or e-mail, for example. But it does, at the 
very least, curb widespread dissemination of this information and it 
contributes materially in this way to its objective — information 
equality between voters in different parts of the country.45 
Justice Fish’s “modern technology” examples, particularly the telephone 
(what about a fax machine?), do not help cement the image of a court 
embracing technology. Where is the “legal harvest” as Binnie J., in his 
inimitable way, puts it? Is Fish J. not aware of social networking 
                                                                                                             
43
  Id., at paras. 40, 41. 
44
  Id., at para. 114. 
45
  Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527, at para. 79 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added). 
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software, or texting or other more rapid and widespread forms of 
“guerilla” communication? One begins to wonder whether the majority 
is scared of technology or displaying a lack of understanding of it, 
neither of which help establish the Court’s legitimacy nor currency. Of 
course, parsing a small passage of Fish J.’s decision for evidence of a 
more general conservativism may be making too much of it — he did 
mention “e-mail” after all.  
More important is the Court’s institutional epistemology. What 
happened in the three years after SOCAN to bring out such apprehension 
in Bryan? The Court seems to go from being hip to hidebound in two 
steps. In Bryan it throws up its hands in apparent surrender, refusing to 
acknowledge the enormous impact current technology has on the social 
and cultural ordering of society. Its main source of knowledge is a 16-
year-old government study. In 1991 there was no e-mail, no Google, no 
YouTube, no iPod or MP3s. No one knew about fantasy and social 
networking games such as Avalon, EverQuest and Second Life. And it 
would have been impossible to fathom that someone in one of these 
games, portraying a virtual realtor, could become an actual millionaire 
through such virtual sales.46 It is not too harsh to say, therefore, that in 
this case, the majority is deeply out of touch with reality.  
Election polling and election results are part of a very different 
world in 2007. Given the divergent opinions in the Bryan and SOCAN 
cases, it is not clear why the Court would ignore many relevant 
technological factors. That is putting it at its mildest. More distressing is 
the possibility that the Court simply selects whether it wants to be up-to-
date or out-of-touch. Given its apparent comfort with technology, 
nuanced understanding of modernity and finely tuned approach to legal 
decision-making in a globally wired world that it displayed in SOCAN, 
the more cynical view does not seem too far-fetched.  
What might have been useful to review in Bryan? For one, social 
network websites such as Facebook,47 MySpace,48 Flickr,49 Friendster,50 
                                                                                                             
46
  Anshe Chung is apparently the first person to make one million real-world dollars through 
her virtual real estate transactions and holdings. (I must confess that I cannot comprehend how this 
works.)  
47
  Online: <http://www.facebook.com>. Facebook and MySpace are the most popular sites. 
According to “Inside Facebook” as of September 2007, there were 42 million Facebook members, a 
doubling from approximately 20 million in September 2006. (See <http://www.insidefacebook.com/ 
2007/09/25/new-numbers-on-facebook-platform-growth/>.) MySpace boasts over 106 million 
members — see Alexa:the Web Information Company at <http://www.alexa.com>.  
48
  Online: <http://www.MySpace.com>. 
49
  Online: <http://www.flickr.com>. 
50
  Online: <http://www.friendster.com>. 
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LinkedIn,51 Bebo52 and Twitter53 are important communicative tools today. 
They are fast becoming powerful forces in their own right, gaining 
attention as phenomena worthy of study. According to the New York 
Times:  
Each day about 1,700 juniors at East Coast college log on to 
Facebook.com to accumulate “friends”, compare movie preferences, 
share videos and exchange cybercocktails and kisses. Unwittingly, 
these students have become the subjects of academic research. To 
study how personal tastes, habits and values affect the formation of 
social relationships (and how social relationships affect tastes, habits 
and values), a team of researchers from Harvard and the University of 
California, Los Angeles, are monitoring the Facebook profiles of an 
entire class of students at one college …54 
The researchers have found that social networks are a form of living, 
breathing entities that reproduce and have a collective memory, a sense 
of purpose, and can achieve things differently from what the individual 
members can on their own.55  
In the digital age, social networks are not only massive and 
ubiquitous, but they are also much easier to follow. People leave digital 
traces of where they are and who they are interacting with; huge amounts 
of data are retained that can be used to investigate fundamental questions 
about social organization, human behaviour and group dynamics. At the 
same time, these networks are much more complex than traditional social 
relationships. As Nicholas Christakis, the Harvard sociologist, notes: 
[I]t is a very, very fundamental observation that things happening in a 
social space beyond your vision — events that occur or choices that are 
made by people you don’t know — can cascade in a conscious or 
subconscious way through a network and affect you. This is a very 
profound and fundamental observation about the operation of social 
life … [W]e have found substantial evidence for the … spread of 
norms … 
Now we are talking about the flow of tastes in privacy through the 
network. And tastes in all kinds of other things, like music, movies, or 
                                                                                                             
51
  Online: <http://www.linkedin.com>. 
52
  Online: <http://www.bebo.com>. 
53
  Online: <http://www.twitter.com>. 
54
  Stephanie Rosenbloom, “On Facebook, Scholars Link up With Data” New York Times, 
December 17, 2007. 
55
  See The Edge, “Social Networks are Like the Eye: A Talk with Nicholas A. Christakis”, 
February 25, 2008, online: <http://www.edge.org>. 
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books, or a taste in food. Or a flow of altruism through the network. 
All of these kinds of things can flow through social networks and obey 
certain rules we are seeking to discover.56 
The implication that these sites and this research has for a lowly 
provision such as section 329 of the Canada Elections Act is clear. 
Social networks and networking sites function incredibly rapidly in ways 
that we are barely beginning to understand. They operate with little 
regulatory control. They can disseminate hard facts and basic information, 
but also behaviours, norms and tastes.  
Moreover, they can be quite insidious. Unlike Bryan’s clumsy 
attempt to alert the public to his website postings, social networks can 
move quickly through vastly disparate groups. For example, one 
Facebook group of politically interested members could send the 
Atlantic Canada poll results to their “friends”, who could then forward to 
a new subgroup of “friends” and so on. Given that the average Facebook 
member has between 150 and 200 friends, it would not take long at all 
for potential recipients to number in the millions.57 
Although the minority in Bryan paid heed to the reality of 
technology and the need to assess the effectiveness of a publication ban 
in an era where circumventing it is made relatively easy by technology, 
it also shied away from acknowledging the revolutionary nature of social 
networking sites (though it did not need to in order to reach its 
determination).58 The majority, however, appeared old-fashioned. It 
made little effort to understand technology in general and social 
networks in particular. By standing on a principle of informational 
equality, in the midst of today’s culture of information sharing, it ends 
up standing on an island in a tsunami. If not yet precarious, this is a 
position that cannot long remain viable.59  
                                                                                                             
56
  Id., at 9. See Nicholas Christakis & James Fowler, “The Spread of Obesity in a Large 
Social Network over 32 Years” (2007) 357 New Engl. J. Med. 370. 
57 
 For statistical information about Facebook, see N.B. Ellison, C. Steinfield, & C. Lampe, 
“The benefits of Facebook ‘friends:’ Social capital and college students’ use of online social network 
sites” (2007) 12(4) J. Computer-Mediated Communication, article 1, online at <http://jcmc.indiana.edu/ 
vol12/ issue4/ellison.html>. 
58
  See Bryan, supra, note 45, at paras. 123-24. Justice Abella referred to the discussion of 
technology found in the Lortie Commission (which was published in 1991!), Professor Waddell’s 
observation of how e-mails, instant messages and phone text messaging can circumvent the 
blackout, and Lamer C.J.C.’s conclusion in Dagenais v. CBC, [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 
S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.) regarding the difficulties of bans in the global electronic age. 
59
  A good example of the power and rapidity by which social networks can operate, and 
one that illustrates what could occur in elections to come, relates to CBC’s recent decision to change 
Radio 2’s program content. Within a few days of the announcement a Facebook “group” was 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 105 
2.  The Continuing Saga of Section 1 Jurisprudence 
As discussed above, the Court’s legitimacy can be harmed when it 
ignores technological reality. This is exacerbated when added to a 
decades old controversy at the Court regarding the proper approach to 
take in determining justification for limits on rights under section 1 of 
the Charter. 
In a 2006 article,60 Professor Sujit Choudhry proposed two versions 
of a “narrative” of the Oakes test: the first, dominant, narrative holds that 
the uniform approach that Oakes established for assessing justifiable 
limits was transformed into a categorization exercise, in which a search 
for varying criteria of deference depending on context eventually 
consumed the Court in doctrinal disagreements and difficulties. The 
second, counter-narrative, lies in the disjunction between the need for 
hard proof at each stage in the Oakes test, the reality of policy making 
under conditions of factual uncertainty, and how the Court allocates risk 
given such uncertainty. Bryan is an illustrative example of how these 
two narratives can combine in surprising ways. 
As Choudhry argues, the dominant narrative provides a legacy of 
inscrutable and irreconcilable decisions. To begin, the Court in Oakes 
rejects arguments about the efficaciousness of reverse onus provisions. 
Less than 10 months later in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd.61 the 
Court accepts that simplicity and administrative convenience are 
legitimate concerns in the proportionality analysis. The Court also 
moves the analytical bar around. Under the minimal impairment stage of 
the analysis, cases were distinguished based on the nature of “competing 
interests”.62 Different outcomes arose depending on whether the state 
acted on behalf of the whole community as a “singular antagonist” or on 
behalf of third parties where it would mediate between competing 
                                                                                                             
created to save Radio 2 (“Save Classical Music at CBC”). Within a matter of weeks, it had close to 
12,000 members. Any news regarding CBC and Radio 2 can now be disseminated in an instant to all 
these members (see John Doyle, “Note to classical music fans: Get Over Yourselves”, The Globe 
and Mail, April 7, 2008, at R3). The repercussions for election results are obvious: election dates are 
known in advance — a group of members could be set up well before the election date (call them 
“Early Election Result Aficionados”). On the night of the election Atlantic Canada results could be 
posted to all members within seconds after they are broadcast. 
60
  Sujit Choudhry, “So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality 
Analysis Under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 501 [hereinafter 
“Choudhry”]. See also R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
61
  [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.). 
62
  Choudhry, supra, note 60, at 512. 
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groups.63 Further refinements occurred by “elevat[ing] the interests of 
third parties to the constitutional level, so that the state can be seen as 
protecting their Charter rights by limiting the Charter rights of others”,64 
or by downgrading the importance of the constitutional right at stake in 
some situations. Both methods are exemplified in R. v. Keegstra65 where 
the right to freedom of expression of racial and religious minorities was 
upgraded to protect victims from the harm of silencing at the same time 
as hate speech was held to be peripheral to the core interests contained in 
the fundamental freedom of expression. But even these refinements were 
short-lived. In cases such as RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney 
General)66 and R. v. Guignard67 the Court withdrew from its position of 
distinguishing between core and peripheral speech.  
Even more useful is Choudhry’s identification of the basic problem 
of deference that bedevils the Court to this day: how the “contextualization” 
of a problem can send deference in opposite directions. As he notes: 
On the one hand, certain kinds of speech have been criminalized with 
the possibility of imprisonment, and therefore on Irwin Toy attract the 
highest standard of review under section 1. But on the other hand, the 
speech in many cases has been peripheral, which argues for deference.68  
As examples, he cites cases such as R v. Butler,69 the Prostitution 
Reference70 and R. v. Sharpe71 in which the criminal nature of the 
underlying offence was ignored while the low value of expression was 
highlighted. He goes on: 
This [failure to acknowledge the criminal side of the issue] is all the 
more bizarre given that Irwin Toy itself raised this problem, because it 
involved the regulation of commercial speech (warranting deference) 
through a regime that created criminal sanctions, including imprisonment 
(warranting no deference), albeit through provincial law.72 
                                                                                                             
63
  Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 
(S.C.C.). See Choudhry, id., at 512. 
64
  Choudhry, id., at 514 (emphasis in original). 
65
  [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.). 
66
  [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.). 
67
  [2002] S.C.J. No. 16, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472 (S.C.C.). 
68
  Choudhry, supra, note 60, at 518. 
69
  [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.). 
70
  Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.). 
71
  [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.). 
72
  Choudhry, supra, note 60, at 519. 
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At present, the dominant narrative has the Court shying away from an 
attempt to categorize the cases into discrete levels of deference, instead 
relying on the same form of analysis but recasting them as factors 
directing the appropriate judicial approach. Context becomes the new 
category. 
All of these same issues arise in Bryan. The publication ban 
provision in the Act, breach of which gives rise to a summary conviction 
offence punishable by a fine, places the state in the role of looking after 
the entire community in the context of a federal election. At the same 
time, the provision attempts to mediate between competing groups such 
as individual voters located in different regions of the country, 
communications and media institutions and political parties, to name but 
a few. Moreover, the majority of the Court believed that the importance 
of elevating electoral fairness outweighed the small, temporary harm to 
freedom of expression. In this case, the majority creates a further 
refinement to Choudhry’s dominant narrative. Here, the expression is not 
downgraded by virtue of it being in the category of less valuable 
expression (being political expression, that would be difficult to do) — it 
is downgraded because (i) the quality of the expression changes depending 
on who holds it;73 and (ii) the restriction is limited in duration. In other 
words, a right can be situationally less important. The dissent, on the 
other hand, stressed that political expression is at the “conceptual core”74 
and receiving election results is a “core democratic right”,75 and an 
“essential part of the democratic process”76 for which it is “difficult to 
imagine a more important aspect”77 of the values protected by section 2(b).  
Choudhry’s counter-narrative is equally germane. In this version, it 
is the cogency of evidence that becomes critical to the approach to 
section 1. Again, a history of conflicts within the Court is highlighted. 
For example, the majority in RJR-MacDonald stressed the need for 
“reasoned demonstration”78 of the “actual” connections, objectives, 
benefits and seriousness79 under Oakes; in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief 
                                                                                                             
73
  See Bastarache J. in Bryan, supra, note 45, at para. 27 where he notes: “to suggest that 
election results are an important political form of expression in the hands of those still to vote is to 
prejudge the entire s. 1 inquiry” (emphasis in original). 
74
  Id., at para. 99.  
75
  Id., at para. 110. 
76
  Id. 
77
  Id., at para. 128. 
78
  RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 66, at para. 129. 
79
  Id., at para. 133. 
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Electoral Officer)80 the majority insisted on avoiding “vague and 
symbolic objectives”.81 The dissenting judges in each of these cases 
expressed a serious concern that governments could be “paralyz[ed]”82 
by such evidentiary requirements where there are “different social or 
political philosophies upon which justifications for or against the 
limitations of rights may be based”.83 As Choudhry notes, the fissures in 
the Court in this version of the narrative centre on the kinds of inferences 
governments can draw from inconclusive evidence84 and the circumstances 
in which “logic” or “common sense” can be used to replace evidentiary 
gaps.85 
So it is no surprise that Professor Choudhry’s counter-narrative 
appears in Bryan. Whereas the majority’s view is captured by Bastarache 
J. stating “I am … forced to resort to logic and common sense applied to 
the Attorney General’s evidence as proof of the harm of loss of public 
confidence in the electoral system as a result of premature release of 
results,”86 the dissent replies with “the evidence submitted by the 
government in this case does not provide the requisite ‘reasoned 
demonstration’ to justify infringing the right at stake to the extent that it 
has”.87 The cogency of evidence is again at the heart of the disagreement. 
What is a surprise is that Choudhry’s counter-narrative has become 
part of the decision-making process itself, in a post-modernist, self-
reflexive way. Now the Court is aware; Bastarache J. quotes directly 
from Choudhry’s counter-narrative section, to bolster his own argument 
for deference: 
As Professor Choudhry aptly notes … : 
Public policy is often based on approximations and extrapolations from 
the available evidence, inferences from comparative data, and, on 
occasion, even educated guesses. Absent a large-scale policy experiment, 
this is all the evidence that is likely to be available. Justice La Forest 
offered an observation in [McKinney …] which rings true: ‘[d]ecisions 
on such matters must inevitably be the product of a mix of conjecture, 
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  [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sauvé]. 
81
  Id., at para. 22. 
82
  RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 66, at para. 67. 
83
  Sauvé, supra, note 78, at para. 67. 
84
  Choudhry, supra, note 60, at 527. 
85
  Id., at 528. 
86
  Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527, at para. 19 (S.C.C.). 
87
  Id., at para. 107. 
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fragmentary knowledge, general experience and knowledge of the 
needs, aspirations and resources of society’.88 
At the same time, the dissent continues to play its role in this narrative 
by claiming 
[W]hile scientific proof may not always be necessary or available, and 
social science evidence supported by reason and logic can be relied 
upon, the evidence must nonetheless establish the consequences of 
imposing or failing to impose the limit.89 
Unfortunately, neither side offers much in the way of a solution to this 
impasse. In fairness to the judges, Choudhry left it open as well.90 
I have two prescriptions to offer. First is to suggest that the Court 
develop a form of best evidence rule for section 1 justifications. The 
“best evidence rule” is a basic evidentiary common law rule that has 
been around for a long time. As stated in Halsbury’s: 
That evidence should be the best that the nature of the case will allow 
is, besides being a matter of obvious prudence, a principle with a 
considerable pedigree. However, any strict interpretation of this 
principle has long been obsolete, and the rule is now only of 
importance in regard to the primary evidence of private documents. 
The logic of requiring the production of an original document where it 
is available rather than relying on possibly unsatisfactory copies, or the 
                                                                                                             
88
  Id., at para. 29. See also Choudhry, supra, note 60, at 524. 
89
  Bryan, id., at para. 103 (Abella J.). 
90
 For a different interpretation of the “problems” of s. 1 jurisprudence in the context of 
expressive rights, see R. Moon, “Justified Limits on Free Expression: The Collapse of the General 
Approach to Limits on Charter Rights” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 337. Moon argues that the two-
step adjudicative model built into Charter adjudication (determination of a rights violation, then 
justification under s. 1) may be part of the problem itself. As he notes at 365: 
[I]n freedom of expression cases, the Court is not simply balancing separate interests and 
giving priority to one value or right over another. Rather, it is making a complex 
judgment about the realization of individual agency and identity in community life. It is 
seeking to draw a line between expression that appeals to conscious reflection or 
autonomous judgment and expression that seeks to manipulate. But there is no bright line 
to be drawn. Where the Court draws the line will depend on contextual factors and their 
impact on individual judgment. The strain on the Oakes test, as the Court attempts to fit 
freedom of expression into the adjudicative structure … manifests itself in the broad 
definition of the freedom’s scope and the deferential approach to limits under section 1. 
Moon’s argument is a strong one. The arguments I make below are perhaps based on a pragmatic 
view that for the foreseeable future we seem to be stuck with the two-step process and the Oakes 
test, so we better make the best of it.  
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recollections of witnesses, is clear, although modern techniques make 
objections to the first alternative less strong.91 
It is normally a rule that applies to primary evidence in the context of a 
trial. Moreover, as noted, it has undergone significant reforms and 
watering-down from its earlier strict application. However, it could be a 
useful principle to resurrect and modify so that it applies to secondary 
sources used to assess a government’s section 1 justification. In this 
context, Halsbury’s principle is still sound — the best evidence is the 
path of prudence. In Bryan, the government’s evidence arguably was 
feeble, and as noted earlier, out of touch with the modern electronic age. 
The Court relied almost entirely on two sources: the Lortie Commission 
report (which was the main source for both the majority and minority of 
the Court) and a Decima Research/Carleton University study by Chris 
Waddle entitled “Most Canadians Prefer Election Night Results 
Blackout.”92 What about more comparative analyses? There are other 
countries where time zones affect elections. For example, several U.S. 
studies have attempted to estimate the impact that the early reporting of 
projected outcomes has had on voter turnout. Many of these have found 
the impact to be slight or negligible despite the fact that California, as 
the most populous state, votes later.93 Or what about the independence of 
the evidence? The Bryan court accepts the government’s own Lortie 
Commission report as sufficient evidence to justify a breach of a right. 
One need only compare the extreme care that the medical profession has 
recently been forced to take in ensuring full disclosure of research 
funding, editorial impartiality and publication integrity to understand the 
need for similar controls in terms of section 1 justification. As Danielle 
Pinard has previously noted, “the law can only ignore the empirical 
realities of the outside world at the expense of its own credibility”.94 The 
incredible expanse of the Internet and electronic era should, one would 
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  Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed., Vol. 17, at 8. See also R. v. Papalia, [1979] S.C.J. 
No. 47, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.) (discussing the best evidence rule in the context of recorded 
conversations where originals had been erased but copies were available). 
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  The only other secondary sources relied upon in the decision were (what else!) Peter 
Hogg’s Constitutional Law of Canada, vol. 2, loose-leaf ed. (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1997), 
updated 2000, rel. 1 and Choudhry, supra, note 60. 
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  See “Note — Exit Polls and the First Amendment” (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1927; 
Anthony M. Barlow, “Restricting Election Day Exit Polling: Freedom of Expression vs. The Right 
to Vote” (1990) 58 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1003, at 1005; L.K. Epstein & G. Strom, “Election Night 
Projections and West Coast Turnout” (1981) 9 Am. Pol. Q. 479. 
94
  Danielle Pinard, “Charter and Context: The Facts for Which We Need Evidence, and the 
Mysterious Other Ones” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 163, at 172. 
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think, give the Court access to both better and more likely impartial, 
evidence. In this instance, common sense should become the last refuge 
of the scoundrel (even a judicial one at that).  
The second prescription is more modest. Perhaps what the Court is 
really saying when it struggles over whether common sense, reason, 
logic or cold, hard empirical evidence is necessary for a particular 
section 1 analysis, is that, in most cases, the inferences that need to be 
made are what Charles Pierce coined as abductive.95 I am not suggesting 
a radical revisioning of section 1. Rather, the Court may find it useful to 
examine the body of literature on abductive reasoning, as I believe it 
would assist with an Oakes analysis, particularly in the need to consider 
the thoroughness of the evidentiary record.  
An abductive inference is simply a plausible inference arrived at 
from a particular provision, not an iron-clad solution. It is an “inference 
to the best explanation” which is, for Pierce, part of common sense logic 
(note the connection to much of what the judges rely on for section 1 
analysis). Much of the concern surrounding the difficulty of assessing 
section 1, in my view, stems from the fact that it is necessarily an 
abductive process. Given the nature of much public policy formulation 
as Choudhry noted, it is much more plausible to recognize that in many 
instances there are only strong or plausible solutions, not necessary or 
infallible ones. John Josephson proposes three considerations that engage 
an abductive analysis and provide an assessment of the strength of an 
inference: 
(1) how decisively the leading hypothesis surpasses the alternatives; 
(2) how well the hypothesis stands by itself, independently of the 
alternatives; 
(3) how thorough the search was for alternatives; 
and two pragmatic considerations, including: 
(4) how strong the need is to come to a conclusion at all, especially 
considering the possibility of gathering further evidence before 
deciding; 
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  I am indebted to Eric Neilsen, a student in my “Federalism and Institutions of 
Government” course, for providing me with information on Pierce’s work in this area. See Pierce on 
Signs, James Hoopes, ed. (London: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); John Josephson, 
“Symposium: Abductive Inference: On the Proof Dynamics of Inference to the Best Explanation” 
(2001) 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1621. 
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(5) the costs of being wrong and the rewards of being right.96 
His typology is intended to apply to any form of argument or justification. 
The first three, however, are directly relevant to a section 1 analysis: a 
measure of reasonableness and appropriateness is only determinable in 
an environment where rigorousness is crucial (particularly in the form of 
assessing the extent of alternatives).  
The Oakes test, particularly in the proportionality aspect, already 
covers some of these considerations. Rational connection, minimal 
impairment and benefits/burdens provide a method of assessment that 
weighs one option against others. However, Josephson’s third component, 
that of thoroughness, is not always present. One might argue that the 
purpose of the minimal impairment test is to provide for an assessment 
of alternative approaches to a particular policy. This is true. It does not 
necessarily, however, give guidance as to how thorough the search was. 
The adversarial system may provide some checks and balances, but is it 
sufficient? Examples of questions that could be employed to assess a 
government’s justification under section 1 include: What is the evidence 
that all plausible justifications have been considered? How deep is the 
lawyer’s/court’s experience in this area? How often have abductions in 
this area turned out to be mistaken because of novel phenomena? Has 
the possibility been considered that some givens are incorrect? Or that 
data merely appeared to be true? Has the possibility been considered that 
justifications based on materials/information from past experience may 
not be adequate to the current situation?97  
As with the best evidence rule described earlier, requiring this to be 
an overt step in the Oakes analysis could help reduce the difficulties 
Choudhry highlights in the Court’s divergence of opinion over section 1 
evidence. In Bryan, for example, the Court’s reluctance to examine the 
staggering influence of technology and new forms of communication 
showed a lack of thoroughness that, as I have attempted to argue above, 
was significant and damaging to its ultimate conclusion. It is certainly 
not clear from the decision that the Court regarded the possibility that 
the Lortie Commission report is of less relevance in the electronic age. 
Moreover, by going through such an exercise, legitimacy will be 
enhanced because a court, in explicitly adverting to the thoroughness of 
evidence collected for the Oakes test, will better appreciate the 
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importance of finding the best available evidence, and will, one would 
hope, be more aware of the need for law to be cognizant of current 
trends.98 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In a country with multiple time zones such as Canada, virtually any 
attempt to control the publication of election results will result in 
conflicts over freedom of expression. The 1991 Lortie Commission 
canvassed a number of approaches to dealing with this problem. It did 
not, however, recommend any changes to the ban on publication of 
election results across time zones. In R. v. Bryan the Supreme Court of 
Canada upheld that law. It did so, as I have argued, without much 
appreciation of the difficulties such a law poses in the electronic age we 
are now living through. 
There is no easy answer to this issue. The need to best preserve 
freedom of expression obviously needs to be considered, however. 
Staggered opening hours for polls across the country goes some way 
towards alleviating the problem. It still leaves the western provinces 
exposed to receiving early results from Atlantic Canada. One way out of 
this dilemma, which would also be safe from technological circumvention, 
is to have an embargo period after polls close so that results would not 
be made available until, for example, 11p.m. in Atlantic Canada. This 
would allow each region to be treated as equally as possible. It would 
not favour those who have access to resources and political connections 
who are able to obtain results before the masses. It would prevent 
websites or social networking sites from posting. At the same time, there 
would not be a breach of anyone’s section 2(b) right, as without 
information, there can be no expression (which may be small consolation 
for those in the east who feel they have a right to know their election 
results as soon as possible, or those who worry that delayed election 
results are signs not of democracy but autocracy). Besides, it may even 
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teach all of us the benefits of a virtue that is in short supply these days: 
patience.99 
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 I like the McLachlin Court’s acknowledgment of the law as an educative, pedagogical 
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